Public transit pricing and optimal government compensation models
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摘要: 为了完善公共交通定价与政府补偿机制, 分析了规模报酬递增、正外部性和次优理论3个潜在经济机理, 建立了3个定价与补偿优化模型, 并以西安公交为例进行了公共交通定价与补偿模型的应用。分析结果表明: 基于规模报酬递增的边际成本定价与补偿模型, 社会福利最佳且最为实用; 基于正外部性的供求平衡定价与补偿模型, 企业福利最佳; 基于次优理论的Ramsey定价与补偿模型, 在原理诠释方面最佳; 补偿模型测算2009年西安公交的政府补偿金额为9.78亿元, 符合现实需求, 模型有效。Abstract: In order to improve public transit pricing and government compensation mechanism, three potential economic principles such as increasing returns to scale, positive externalities and second-best theory were elaborated. Three models for pricing and calculating optimal compensation were established. The application of public transit pricing and compensation models was studied with Xi'an as an example. Analysis result indicates that the pricing and compensation model of marginal cost based on increasing returns to scale is identified as best social welfare and being the most practical, another model of supply-demand balance based on positive externalities can get optimum corporate welfare, and the model of Ramsey pricing and compensation based on second-best theory is better for explaining principles. The government compensation amount of Xi'an in 2009 is calculated at 978 million yuan, the outcome basically agrees with the actual demand, and the models are effective.
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图 1 规模报酬递增对公交定价与补偿的影响
Figure 1. Impact of increasing returns to scale on public transit pricing and compensation
图 2 正外部性对公交定价与补偿的影响
Figure 2. Impact of positive externalities on public transit pricing and compensation
图 3 次优定价对公交定价与补偿的影响
Figure 3. Impact of second-best pricing on public transit pricing and compensation
表 1 公共交通定价与补偿模型评价
Table 1. Evaluation on models of public transit pricing and compensation
模型 边际成本定价 供求平衡定价 Ramsey定价 优势 能够反映将来需求增加所引起的成本变动; 能够反映公交服务的真实成本价格, 有利于资源优化配置, 实现社会福利剩余最大化 对公交企业的正外部性给予补偿, 从整个社会来看可获得净收益; 经济补偿表面上属于政府财政支出, 但实际是一种支付转移 充分考虑公交服务边际成本与需求价格弹性; 保证公交企业财务收支平衡; 在收支平衡前提下, 实现社会总福利最大化; 有利于促进公交市场有效竞争 劣势 边际成本的预测和估计影响了结果的准确性; 追求静态效率的短期边际成本定价将导致投资的不足; 政府财务负担沉重, 对经济造成扭曲; 公交服务质量与收益脱钩, 易引发行业无效率 外部效益种类繁多, 获得者广泛, 难以准确计量; 交易成本高昂, 补偿成本有可能超过补偿收益, 导致补偿失效; 作为一种间接补助方式, 它只补偿一部分社会公众 社会福利分配可能存在不公平; 需要大量历史数据与信息, 操作复杂; 理论性强, 适用性存在诸多局限 评价 社会福利最佳 企业福利最佳 原理诠释最佳 
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表 2 出行者补偿价格预测
Table 2. Compensation price forecasting of travelers
类别 收入均值/元 可接受月交通支出/元 补偿价格/元 学生 300 18.3 1.171 低保人群 300 18.3 1.171 老年人 1.347 IC卡持有者 1 338 81.6 0.562 无IC卡出行者
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表 3 2009年公交出行者构成
Table 3. Structure of public transit travelers in 2009
类别 学生 低保人群 老年人 IC卡持有者 比例/% 14.0 3.2 6.2 76.6 预测客运量/万人次 19 145 4 376 8 478 104 747
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