公路建设项目法人激励模型与机制

基金项目:

湖南省交通厅科技进步与创新项目 200207

Incentive model and mechanism for legal person of highway construction project

1.
Department of Management Engineering, Changsha Communications University, Changsha 410076, China
2.
Guangdong Expressway Co. Ltd., Guangzhou 510100, China

Article Text (Baidu Translation)

摘要: 运用博奕理论与方法, 从行为和利益的角度构建和分析了项目法人制下公路建设项目经营者的几种激励模型, 提出了通过综合激励方案的设计建立不对称信息条件下的项目法人利益实现机制的具体途径。
- 公路建设 /
- 项目法人 /
- 激励模型 /
- 机制
Abstract: With Game Theory, the interests and behaviers of legal person and operator were analyzed. The incentive model of operator was developed to unify the interests of operator and legal person, so as to excite the operator's activities and realize legal person's interests on the condition of unsymmetrical information. The preject's quality can be assured.
- highway construction /
- project legal person /
- incentive model /
- mechanism

图 1 不对称信息条件下的监督与激励

Figure 1. Supervision and incentive on operator under unsymmetrical information

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