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摘要: 价格战已成为威胁区域内港口物流企业发展的重要因素, 选择何种策略应对或避免价格战的威胁已成为港口物流企业关注的焦点。运用Bertrand寡占模型, 分析了建立港口物流企业联盟的效益, 通过构建一系列获益矩阵对港口物流企业在价格战中的策略选择进行了研究。理论分析表明建立非价格竞争的差异化发展策略指导下的区域内港口物流企业的战略联盟, 是港口物流企业应对挑战, 实现良性竞争、行业可持续发展和服务区域经济协调发展的有效途径。Abstract: Price war has become one of major threats to the development of regional port logistics enterprises, the selection of strategy to deal with or avoid the threat has been focused on by port logistics enterprises. Bertrand oligopoly model was applied to analyze the benefit of establishing port logistics enterprise alliance, a series of payoff matrices were formulated to study the strategy choice of port logistics enterprises in price war. It is pointed that the regional port logistics strategic alliance, guided by differentiation strategy for development in non-price competition, is an efficient way for enterprises to meet the challenge, achieve optimal competition, promote the sustainable development of port logistics industry and benefit the regional economy.
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Key words:
- logistics engineering /
- port /
- logistics enterprise /
- price war /
- game theory /
- strategy
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表 1 获益矩阵1
Table 1. Benefit matrix 1
港口2 港口1 稳定价格 降价 稳定价格 364.5, 364.5 364.5+U0, 364.5-U0 降价 364.5-U0, 364.5+U0 324, 324 
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表 2 获益矩阵2
Table 2. Benefit matrix 2
港口2 港口1 稳定价格 降价 稳定价格 364.5+A, 364.5+A 364.5+U0, 364.5-U0 降价 364.5-U0, 364.5+U0 324, 324
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表 3 获益矩阵3
Table 3. Benefit matrix 3
港口2 港口1 稳定价格 降价 稳定价格 364.5, 364.5 364.5-U0#, 364.5+U0# 降价 364.5+U0#, 364.5-U0# 324, 324
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表 4 获益矩阵4
Table 4. Benefit matrix 4
港口2 港口1 稳定价格 降价 稳定价格 U′, U′ 364.5-U0#, 364.5+U0# 降价 364.5+U0#, 364.5-U0# 324, 324
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表 5 获益矩阵5
Table 5. Benefit matrix 5
港口2 港口1 稳定价格 降价 稳定价格 U′+A, U′+A 364.5-U0#, 364.5+U0# 降价 364.5+U0#, 364.5-U0# 324, 324
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