Multi-mode competitiveness game model in regional comprehensive passenger transportation corridor
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摘要: 为了研究综合客运通道内多方式价格竞争对市场分担率与利润的影响, 基于非集计NL模型与博弈理论, 构建了各客运方式市场分担率与运输价格关系的双矩阵博弈模型。以成渝通道为基础, 研究了高速铁路和高速公路大巴2种典型运输方式不同情景下的市场竞争均衡价格与分担率的变化特征。分析结果表明: 在采用双矩阵博弈模型所计算的均衡价格条件下, 高速铁路和高速公路大巴平均市场分担率分别增加了56.15%和80.58%, 有利于发挥二者的规模效益; 当出行模式结构相同时, 时间价值的变化会影响运营利润和市场分担率, 随着时间价值系数的增大, 高速铁路的平均运营利润增加34.60%, 平均市场分担率增加9.98%, 同时高速公路大巴平均运营利润减少29.70%, 平均市场分担率减少3.49%;对于出行时间处于劣势的高速公路大巴, 适当降低票价有利于增加营运利润; 该博弈模型的计算结果符合区域综合运输通道客运市场实际变化规律, 高速铁路和高速公路大巴不可能通过无限制降价的方式来追求最大利润, 运营利润都呈现先增后减的趋势, 在某个价格下运营利润最大; 该博弈模型具有价格均衡解, 在外界情况变化时, 通过博弈高速铁路和高速公路大巴价格可以达到利润最优状态。Abstract: In order to study the effect of multi-mode price competition on the market share rates and profits in comprehensive passenger transportation corridor, based on the non-aggregated NL model and the game theory, a bi-matrix game model was build to describe the relationship between market share rate and transportation price of each transportation mode. Taking Chengdu-Chongqing Transportation Channel as an example, the variation characteristics of market competition equilibrium prices and market share rates of two typical modes of high-speed railway and highway bus were studied.Analysis result shows that under the condition of equilibrium price calculated by the bi-matrix game model, the average market share rates of highspeed railway and highway bus increase by 56.15% and 80.58%, respectively, which is beneficial to improve their scale efficiencies.Under the same travel mode structure, the change of timevalue influences operating profit and market share rate. With the increase of time value coefficient, the average operating profit and market share rate of high-speed railway increase by 34.60% and 9.98%, respectively.At the same time, the average operating profit and market share rate of highway bus decrease by 29.70% and 3.49%, respectively.When the highway bus has a disadvantage time value, an appropriate reduction of fare is conducive to increase the operating profit.Therefore, the result computed by the game model is consistent with the actual changing law of passenger transport market in regional comprehensive passenger transportation corridor.It's impossible to pursue the maximum profits through unrestricted price cuts for highspeed railway and highway bus.The operating profits increase first and then decrease, finally reach the maximum operating profits at a certain price.The game model has a price equilibrium solution, and when the external situation changes, the high-speed railway and highway bus would achieve the best profit state through the game model.
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Key words:
- traffic management /
- multi-mode price competition /
- game theory /
- NL model /
- market evolution /
- market share rate
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