Revenue allocation model for port cooperation with considering of risk and contribution
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摘要: 为了有效地激励港口之间实现联盟, 实现港口联盟成员的共赢, 考虑各港口在合作中的贡献及所承担的风险, 根据互惠互利原则、贡献收益相匹配原则和风险收益相匹配原则, 构建一个基于合作博弈的港口收益分配的非线性规划模型, 通过具体算例对模型进行了应用分析。分析结果表明: 由收益分配模型得到的各个港口的收益均高于各个港口单独经营所得到的收益, 各个港口的收益之和等于3个港口联盟体所得到的总收益, 因此, 规划模型能带来较高的经济效益, 并实现经济效益的合理分配。Abstract: In order to effectively stimulate the port cooperation and achieve the improvement of all individual ports' benefit, the contribution to cooperation and the risk in cooperation were considered, a nonlinear programming model was developed to design revenue allocation scheme in port cooperation according to the principles of mutual benefits, contribution-income matching, risk-income matching, a numerical example was given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the model. Analysis result shows that the individual port revenue obtained by the proposed model is greater than that when individual port operates separately, and the sum of individual port revenue is equal to the total revenue of three port cooperations, so the model can bring high economic benefit and realize the reasonable distribution of economic benefit.
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Key words:
- transportation economy /
- port cooperation /
- non-linear programming /
- risk revenue /
- contribution revenue
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表 1 各港口及港口联盟的最大需求
Table 1. Maximum demands for individual port and port alliance
港口联盟中的港口个数 港口联盟的最大需求 S=1 {1} {2} {3} 800 700 900 S=2 {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} 1 300 1 300 1 400 S=3 {1, 2, 3} 1 800 
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表 2 各港口参数
Table 2. Parameters for individual port
港口 μi ηi ci ai bi di i=1 44 6 2.0 2 1.0 4 400 i=2 45 7 3.0 2 1.5 5 300 i=3 42 4 2.5 2 1.0 7 250
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表 3 最大收益
Table 3. Maximum revenues
港口联盟中的港口个数 港口联盟的最大收益 S=1 {1} {2} {3} 1 657.450 681.207 1 519.796 S=2 {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} 5 565.056 5 481.043 6 052.684 S=3 {1, 2, 3} 12 267.640
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表 4 风险因子权重
Table 4. Risk factor weights
市场风险 港口自身风险 合作风险 外贸依存度 贸易摩擦大小 港口布局 投资回报率 建设周期 管理差异 地理差异 道德风险 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4
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表 5 港口j对港口i的风险评估
Table 5. Risk evaluation in port i by port j
港口 i=1 i=2 i=3 合作风险 市场风险 港口自身风险 合作风险 市场风险 港口自身风险 合作风险 市场风险 港口自身风险 j=1 0.70 0.480 0.38 0.70 0.480 0.620 0.60 0.48 0.420 j=2 0.60 0.480 0.54 0.70 0.760 0.380 0.60 0.56 0.540 j=3 0.40 0.504 0.50 0.30 0.528 0.524 0.72 0.56 0.444
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表 6 各港口在不同结盟时的效用
Table 6. Utilities of different alliances for individual port
S′=1 获得票数 效用 S′=2 获得票数 效用 S′=3 获得票数 效用 {1} 2 0 {1, 2} 3 1 {1, 2, 3} 5 1 {2} 1 0 {1, 3} 4 1 {3} 2 0 {2, 3} 3 1
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