TANG Zhi-ying, ZHOU De-su, YE Huai-zhen. Two-stage dynamic incentive model of synergy and innovation for logistics alliance[J]. Journal of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, 2013, 13(4): 94-101. doi: 10.19818/j.cnki.1671-1637.2013.04.014
Citation: TANG Zhi-ying, ZHOU De-su, YE Huai-zhen. Two-stage dynamic incentive model of synergy and innovation for logistics alliance[J]. Journal of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, 2013, 13(4): 94-101. doi: 10.19818/j.cnki.1671-1637.2013.04.014

Two-stage dynamic incentive model of synergy and innovation for logistics alliance

doi: 10.19818/j.cnki.1671-1637.2013.04.014
More Information
  • Author Bio:

    TANG Zhi-ying(1974-), female, associate professor, doctoral student, +86-28-84077792, 80368343@qq.com

    YE Huai-zhen(1943-), female, professor, +86-28-87603640, yhz16@163.com

  • Received Date: 2013-02-18
  • Publish Date: 2013-08-25
  • In order to improve the synergy level and income status of logistics alliance, the income of third party logistics (TPL) was taken as objective function, the incentive compatibility constraint and retained income of member were taken as constraint conditions, and the two-stage dynamic incentive model of synergy and innovation for logistics alliance was established.With the change of substitutable degree for the two tasks such as synergy and innovation, the optimal incentive coefficient and the optimal effort level were calculated, and the fixed incomes of member and the incomes of TPL under the single-stage static incentive and the two-stage dynamic incentive were compared.Analysis result shows that when the retained income of member is 0.6 million yuan and substitutable degree are 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 respectively, the fixed incomes of member are-1.087 7, -1.095 3, -1.084 8, -1.063 0, -1.033 4, -0.999 3 million yuan respectively under the single-stage static incentive and are-1.236 7, -1.106 5, -0.995 1, -0.898 3, -0.816 2, -0.744 7 million yuan under the two-stage dynamic incentive.The incomes of TPL are 1.092 2, 1.100 9, 1.091 1, 1.069 5, 1.039 5, 1.003 2 million yuan respectively under the single-stage static incentive and are 1.245 4, 1.117 2, 1.007 3, 0.911 8, 0.828 1, 0.753 0 million yuan respectively under the two-stage dynamic incentive, the incomes of TPL increase 14.03%, 1.48%, -7.68%, -14.75%, -20.34%, -24.94% respectively.The fixed income of member, the optimal incentive coefficient and the optimal effort level increase with the increase of substitutable degree.When substitutable degree is 0.2, the income of TPL is maximum, and the scheme is optimal.

     

  • loading
  • [1]
    HELMI B R, LAURE M G, VINCENT B, et al. Measuring innovation best practices: improvement of an innovation index integrating threshold and synergy effects[J]. Technovation, 2008, 28 (12): 838-854. doi: 10.1016/j.technovation.2008.08.005
    [2]
    LONG Yue, YI Shu-ping. Collaborative management optimization of logistics task alliance with two-stage decision-making[J]. Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, 2010, 16 (4): 802-809. (in Chinese). https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JSJJ201004020.htm
    [3]
    TANG Jian-min. Analysis on common factors in"leadermember"logistics alliance synergy management[J]. Science and Technology Management Research, 2010, 31 (17): 238-241. (in Chinese). doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1000-7695.2010.17.059
    [4]
    GUO Yan, ZHANG Shi-ying, GUO Bin, et al. Study of strategy on contract scheme for partner selection in strategic alliance[J]. Journal of Systems Engineering, 2004, 19 (5): 477-481. (in Chinese). doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1000-5781.2004.05.007
    [5]
    BENGT H, PAUL M. Multi-task principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership and job design[J]. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1991, 7 (2): 24-52.
    [6]
    CLARKE F H, DARROUGH M N. Optimal employment contracts in a principal-agent relationship[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1983, 4 (2/3): 69-90.
    [7]
    GIBBONS R, MURPHY K J. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: theory and evidence[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1992, 100 (3): 468-505. doi: 10.1086/261826
    [8]
    CHEN An, LIU Lu, LI Gang, et al. The"optimal-optimal"strategy of virtual enterprise coordination[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory and Practice, 2000, 20 (8): 12-17. (in Chinese). doi: 10.3321/j.issn:1000-6788.2000.08.003
    [9]
    RAFFI I, DHANANJAY N. Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1999, 27 (2): 177-201. doi: 10.1016/S0165-4101(99)00009-9
    [10]
    BENGT H. Managerial incentive problems: a dynamic perspective[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66 (1): 169-182. doi: 10.1111/1467-937X.00083
    [11]
    MEYER M A, VICKERS J. Performance comparisons and dynamic incentives[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1997, 105 (3): 547-581. doi: 10.1086/262082
    [12]
    EMST-LUDWIG V T. An incentive problem in the dynamic theory of banking[J]. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002, 38 (1/2): 271-292.
    [13]
    WANG Xiao-ming, LI Shi-ming, YANG Hua-gang, et al. Study on dynamic incentive contracts in telecom business innovation with win-win consideration[J]. Journal of Systems Engineering, 2011, 26 (10): 671-678. (in Chinese). https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-XTGC201105016.htm
    [14]
    MA Xin-an, ZHANG Lie-ping, TIAN Peng. Information sharing incentive in supply chain—a dynamic model[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2001, 9 (1): 19-24. (in Chinese). https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGGK200101003.htm
    [15]
    ZHANG De-hai, LIU De-wen. Analysis on coordination strategy under multi-agent case for logistics service innovation network[J]. East China Economic Management, 2009, 23 (12): 108-110. (in Chinese). doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-5097.2009.12.025
    [16]
    GUAN Qi-liang, ZHOU Gen-gui, CAO Jian. On the incentive mechanism for multi-task principal-agent closed-loop supply chain[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2009, 12 (4): 23-27. (in Chinese). doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2009.04.006
    [17]
    ZHANG Yong. A class of multi-task principal-agent model[J]. Modern Management Science, 2005 (9): 37-38, 12. (in Chinese). doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-368X.2005.09.013
    [18]
    WANG Ying, SUN Lin-yan, CHEN Hong. Logistics synthesis evaluating on DEA/AHP two-stage model[J]. Journal of Chang'an University: Natural Science Edition, 2003, 23 (3): 79-84. (in Chinese). https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-XAGL200303022.htm
    [19]
    LIU Dong-bo, CHEN Yu-juan, ZHANG Zi-qiang, et al. Virtual enterprise dynamic supervision mechanism based on the third supervisory organization[J]. Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, 2009, 15 (10): 2073-2079. (in Chinese). https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JSJJ200910031.htm
    [20]
    HUANG Xiao-yuan, LU Zhen, ZHANG Zhe. The principalagent model of trade promotion strategies in supply chain[J]. Journal of Northeastern University: Natural Science, 2002, 23 (1): 79-82. (in Chinese). https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-DBDX200201021.htm
    [21]
    NIU Yong-liang. Development pattern and operation mechanism of logistics[J]. Journal of Chang'an University: Social Science Edition, 2006, 8 (1): 15-18, 23. (in Chinese). https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-XBJZ200601003.htm
    [22]
    MA Tian-shan, MU Yi. Study on activity-based costing in logistics cost management[J]. Journal of Chang'an University: Social Science Edition, 2005, 7 (2): 1-3, 16. (in Chinese). https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-XBJZ200502002.htm

Catalog

    Article Metrics

    Article views (1183) PDF downloads(931) Cited by()
    Related

    /

    DownLoad:  Full-Size Img  PowerPoint
    Return
    Return