Multi-mode competitiveness game model in regional comprehensive passenger transportation corridor

LIU Shuai; TANG Bo-ming; CHEN Jian

Volume 17 Issue 2

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LIU Shuai, TANG Bo-ming, CHEN Jian. Multi-mode competitiveness game model in regional comprehensive passenger transportation corridor[J]. Journal of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, 2017, 17(2): 136-142.

Citation:

LIU Shuai, TANG Bo-ming, CHEN Jian. Multi-mode competitiveness game model in regional comprehensive passenger transportation corridor[J]. Journal of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, 2017, 17(2): 136-142.

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Multi-mode competitiveness game model in regional comprehensive passenger transportation corridor

LIU Shuai^1
,,
TANG Bo-ming^1
,,
CHEN Jian^{1, 2}

1.
School of Civil Engineering, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China
2.
School of Transportation, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China

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Author Bio:
LIU Shuai(1982-), male, doctoral student, +86-23-62652397, wordday@sina.com

TANG Bo-ming(1962-), male, professor, PhD, +86-23-62652397, tbm@netease.com
Received Date: 2016-10-18
Publish Date: 2017-04-25

Abstract

Abstract

In order to study the effect of multi-mode price competition on the market share rates and profits in comprehensive passenger transportation corridor, based on the non-aggregated NL model and the game theory, a bi-matrix game model was build to describe the relationship between market share rate and transportation price of each transportation mode. Taking Chengdu-Chongqing Transportation Channel as an example, the variation characteristics of market competition equilibrium prices and market share rates of two typical modes of high-speed railway and highway bus were studied.Analysis result shows that under the condition of equilibrium price calculated by the bi-matrix game model, the average market share rates of highspeed railway and highway bus increase by 56.15% and 80.58%, respectively, which is beneficial to improve their scale efficiencies.Under the same travel mode structure, the change of timevalue influences operating profit and market share rate. With the increase of time value coefficient, the average operating profit and market share rate of high-speed railway increase by 34.60% and 9.98%, respectively.At the same time, the average operating profit and market share rate of highway bus decrease by 29.70% and 3.49%, respectively.When the highway bus has a disadvantage time value, an appropriate reduction of fare is conducive to increase the operating profit.Therefore, the result computed by the game model is consistent with the actual changing law of passenger transport market in regional comprehensive passenger transportation corridor.It's impossible to pursue the maximum profits through unrestricted price cuts for highspeed railway and highway bus.The operating profits increase first and then decrease, finally reach the maximum operating profits at a certain price.The game model has a price equilibrium solution, and when the external situation changes, the high-speed railway and highway bus would achieve the best profit state through the game model.
- traffic management,
- multi-mode price competition,
- game theory,
- NL model,
- market evolution,
- market share rate

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References(25)

References

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